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Editors’Summary
The brookings panel on Economic Activity held its seventy-ninth con-
ference in Washington, D.C., on March 31 and April 1, 2005. This issue of
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity includes the papers and discussions
presented at the conference. The first four articles address the position of
the United States in the global economy, an increasingly controversial sub-
ject in the research, financial, and policy communities. Since the early
1990s, U.S. current account deficits have grown almost without interrup-
tion, reaching $666 billion, or about 6 percent of GDP, in 2004. The U.S.
international investment position is now one of net indebtedness approach-
ing 30 percent of GDP, and in recent years a substantial portion of the
buildup in net debt has come in the form of additions to dollar reserves by
foreign central banks. Some observers see the present situation as unsus-
tainable and warn of an abrupt depreciation of the dollar, which could
destabilize financial markets and disrupt the global economy. Others are
more sanguine, arguing that the present situation reflects the relative
strength of the U.S. economy, consumer and business preferences, and
rational financial decisions, all of which could evolve so as to make any
needed adjustments gradual. 
Each of the four articles takes a different approach to analyzing the sit-
uation, focusing on issues that the authors see as key. The first article
models portfolio choices and how they moderate the pace of adjustment in
exchange rates and current accounts. The second stresses the relative price
changes that will be needed, both in the United States and abroad, to move
the U.S. current account toward balance. The third considers the motiva-
tions of policymakers in China and elsewhere for accumulating dollar
reserves. The fourth assesses the likelihood of an abrupt depreciation of the
dollar and the economic instability that might result in the United States
and abroad. The volume concludes with an article on the possible impact of
slowing labor force growth on stock market returns. 
ixThe u.s. international investment position is affected by develop-
ments in both foreign trade and international capital ﬂows—the market for
imports and exports of goods and services and the market for foreign and
domestic assets. The sustainability of the U.S. current account deﬁcit and
the consequences of reducing that deﬁcit depend on features of both those
markets. Most economic models that have been used to analyze the cur-
rent account deﬁcit assume imperfect substitutability between foreign and
domestic goods and services but perfect substitutability between foreign
and domestic assets. These assumptions carry strong implications for how
the economy adjusts to new developments. In the first article in this
volume, Olivier Blanchard, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa provide a
distinctive analysis that allows for imperfect substitutability between
domestic and foreign assets and between domestic and foreign goods. With
this feature, movements in exchange rates and asset prices have poten-
tially important effects on the portfolios of international investors and
strong implications for the speed with which exchange rates adjust to
shocks. Compared with popular discussion and with earlier, simpler mod-
els, this rich speciﬁcation provides a better understanding of past develop-
ments in the U.S. current account balance and the dollar exchange rate
and a more realistic framework for assessing future prospects. 
In its simplest form the authors’model has just two regions—the United
States and the rest of the world—each of which supplies interest-bearing
assets. The wealth of each region is given by the value of domestic assets
plus net claims on foreigners. Investors diversify their portfolios, holding
both foreign and U.S. assets, but exhibit home bias: given equal expected
returns, they place a larger fraction of their wealth in domestic than in for-
eign assets. As a result, a shift in wealth to foreigners reduces the demand
for U.S. assets, causing the dollar to depreciate. Similarly, an increase in
private or government demand for dollar assets causes the dollar to appre-
ciate. Because of imperfect substitutability, the relative returns on foreign
and U.S. assets can vary with changes in relative supplies or shifts in the
distribution of world wealth, and uncovered interest parity does not hold. 
In the model the effects of a depreciation on the path of the current
account balance and changes in U.S. net foreign indebtedness are conven-
tional. The current account balance is the sum of the trade balance and net
interest earnings. Dollar depreciation improves both, immediately reducing
the dollar value of net interest payments and eventually reducing the U.S.
trade deﬁcit. Changes in U.S. net foreign indebtedness reﬂect the sum of the
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lios that arise from exchange rate movements. In the real world, asset val-
ues and therefore net debt will also change with changes in domestic
interest rates, but the model ignores these so as to focus on exchange rate
movements, which are the key for understanding the model’s distinctive
implications. 
Whereas the response of the current account in the model is quite famil-
iar, the effect of depreciation on asset demands is quite different than in
conventional models where assets are perfect substitutes. Depreciation of
the dollar reduces U.S. net indebtedness directly, increasing the dollar value
of foreign assets held in U.S. portfolios while decreasing the value of U.S.
assets in foreign portfolios. If assets were perfect substitutes, these changes
in portfolio shares would be of no importance, and the expected returns on
U.S. and foreign assets would always have to be equal. With ﬁxed domes-
tic interest rates, the expected change in exchange rates would then be zero.
In such a world, real exchange rate changes are always unexpected. With
imperfect substitutability, in the absence of compensating changes in
expected relative rates of return, investors in both regions will want to
rebalance their portfolios following an unexpected exchange rate move-
ment. Thus an unexpected depreciation of the dollar in response to a trade
shock actually increases the relative demand for U.S. assets, reducing but
not reversing the depreciation. Unlike in the case of perfect substitutability,
the expected returns on U.S. and foreign assets do not have to be the same
after the initial adjustment. Rather than jump all the way to a new equilib-
rium from which no further change is expected, the dollar undergoes a
sharp initial, unexpected depreciation followed by a more gradual, expected
depreciation. The expected depreciation merely reduces the desired shares
of U.S. assets in investors’portfolios rather than causing massive flight
from dollars. The rate at which the dollar depreciates after its initial
response to an adverse shock depends on the elasticity of asset demands
with respect to the relative rates of return: the lower the elasticity, the more
gradual the depreciation and the improvement in the current account. 
Since observed outcomes are always the result of past and present
shocks, the dynamics of adjustment toward the steady state are of particu-
lar interest. The authors analyze two representative cases. In response to a
shock that increases the trade deﬁcit, such as an increase in U.S. economic
activity or an enlarged preference for imports, there is, as explained above,
an initial, unexpected depreciation of the dollar, followed by a gradual
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much of the depreciation is immediate and how much takes place on the
subsequent path of adjustment depend on the response of trade to the depre-
ciation and on the responsiveness of portfolio demands to the anticipated
changes in relative rates of return. The less substitutability between for-
eign and U.S. assets, the smaller will be the initial depreciation, and the
more rapid the subsequent depreciation. However, the eventual deprecia-
tion in the new steady state is the same, and large enough to generate a
sufﬁcient trade surplus to offset the higher interest payments on the larger
debt. 
The second case involves a response to a shock that increases the
demand for U.S. assets, such as an increase in demand by foreign govern-
ments. In this case the reduced supply available to private portfolios leads
to an initial dollar appreciation. This enlarges the trade deﬁcit, adding to the
future ﬂow of dollar assets supplied. The subsequent path is one of a grad-
ual, anticipated depreciation and increase in net debt. Despite the initial
favorable portfolio shift, the new steady state requires a weaker dollar,
since, as in the previous example, the trade surplus must be larger to offset
the interest payments on the now-larger debt.
The authors suggest that the U.S. experience of recent years can be
understood as responses to shocks like those just described. In their view a
shift in private portfolio preferences toward U.S. assets led initially to an
appreciation of the dollar. Independently, a shift in the preferences of U.S.
consumers toward foreign goods worsened the trade balance by more than
can be explained by exchange rate and income effects. As described above,
both kinds of shifts predict an eventual sustained dollar depreciation to a
level below that prevailing before the shift. Although the accumulation of
reserves by foreign governments has supported the dollar against some cur-
rencies, the authors argue that the United States has entered the deprecia-
tion phase of the adjustment that their model predicts. 
To assess future prospects, and in particular how large an eventual dollar
depreciation should be expected, the authors quantify their model using
estimates of present wealth, assets, portfolio shares, and net debt for the
United States and the rest of the world, together with estimates of model
parameter values based on existing empirical studies and some assumptions
about adjustment speeds and policy preferences. For 2003 these estimates
include the following: U.S. assets of $36.8 trillion, foreign assets of $33.3
trillion, and U.S. net foreign debt of $2.7 trillion; 77 percent of U.S. wealth
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assets. In the model these shares imply that a transfer of one dollar of U.S.
wealth to foreigners leads to a decrease of 48 cents in demand for U.S.
assets. The estimated trade elasticities imply that a 1-percentage-point
reduction in the ratio of the trade deﬁcit to GDP requires a depreciation of
15 percent. 
Armed with these quantifications of their model, the authors use it to
predict where the U.S. international position is headed. First they calcu-
late the exchange rate adjustment that would be needed to maintain the pre-
sent net debt position as a steady state, under the implicit assumption that
the economy has already adjusted to past shocks, and introducing no impor-
tant asymmetries between foreign and U.S. interest rates or growth rates. In
this case the ratio of the current account deﬁcit to GDPthat can be sustained
indefinitely is given by the economy’s growth rate times the ratio of net
debt to GDP. With 3 percent annual growth in U.S. GDP, maintaining a
net debt ratio of about 25 percent requires reducing the current account
deﬁcit from its present 6 percent to 0.75 percent of GDP. With annual inter-
est rates at 4 percent, this requires a depreciation of the dollar of 56 percent.
The authors note some important qualifications to this calculation. To the
extent that the present current account deficit reflects J-curve effects in
response to the dollar’s recent depreciation (in which a depreciation at
first worsens the current account balance before improving it), it over-
states the additional depreciation required. Noting that the current
account continued to worsen for nearly two years after the depreciation
of the mid-1980s began, they estimate that a similar path this time would
mean that only a 34 percent further depreciation is needed. They also
note that if the U.S. net debt ratio were allowed to stabilize at a higher
level than the present, the equilibrium current account deficit could be
larger. 
As an alternative way to assess the dollar’s prospects, the authors under-
take dynamic simulations of the response to trade and portfolio shocks in
which the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio is endogenous. Simulating per-
manent shocks to the trade deﬁcit, they calculate that a 1-percent-of-GDP
shift away from U.S. goods increases the equilibrium net debt ratio by 
17 percentage points and causes the dollar to depreciate by 12.5 percent.
Simulating shifts in asset preferences, they calculate that, in response to a
shift that raises the share of U.S. assets in both U.S. and foreign portfolios
by 5 percentage points, the dollar initially appreciates and then eventually
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point increase in the net debt ratio. A striking feature of both simulations
is how long it takes to reach equilibrium. After fifty years the adjustment
is still far from complete, with the dollar still above its pre-shock level after
the shift toward dollar assets, and the depreciation only about two-thirds
complete after the shift in trade away from U.S. goods. Although they ques-
tion the realism of these extraordinary adjustment periods, the authors
believe they do correctly show that the adjustment process can be very
long. 
Such gradualism contrasts with the predictions of some observers that
the dollar is likely to fall abruptly in the near future. To evaluate this pos-
sibility, the authors examine under what conditions their model would pre-
dict a faster depreciation than in their baseline simulations. As discussed
above, the anticipated rate of depreciation is faster, the less substitutability
there is between U.S. and foreign assets, with the extreme case of constant
shares providing an upper bound. For this case the authors show that the
anticipated rate of depreciation depends on the change in the ratio of U.S.
net debt to U.S. assets: a faster rise in the debt ratio requires a more rapid
depreciation to maintain portfolio balance. In a situation where the net
debt ratio is rising by 5 percent a year, and with a ratio of gross assets to
GDP of 3—both rough approximations of recent experience—they calcu-
late an anticipated rate of depreciation of 2.7 percent a year. This estimate
is based on anticipated portfolio shares remaining constant. In the model,
however, the rate of depreciation will also be affected by any anticipated
change in the relative demand for U.S. assets—a shock imposed on top of
the constant-shares assumption in the previous calculation. If the demand
for shares of U.S. assets in foreign or domestic portfolios is expected to
decline, the expected depreciation can be much faster. For example, if the
share of U.S. assets demanded in foreign portfolios is expected to decline
by 2 percentage points over the coming year, the expected depreciation
rises to 8.7 percent. 
The authors note that there is considerable disagreement about the share
of U.S. assets that foreigners will want to hold in the future. Some
observers argue that foreign central banks will continue their recent policy
of adding to dollar holdings. Others see a latent demand for U.S. assets
by private Chinese investors who are currently restrained by capital con-
trols. Although the authors consider these outcomes possible, they find it
more likely that the relative demand for U.S. assets will decline in the near
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portfolios away from U.S. assets, or both. The calculations just provided
for a shift in shares are then relevant. The authors also observe that the
longer the peg continues, the larger both the initial and the eventual depre-
ciation will be. 
The depreciation of the dollar since its 2002 peak has been very uneven
against different currencies: the dollar has fallen 45 percent against the
euro, 25 percent against the yen, and not at all against the Chinese ren-
minbi. To investigate how future adjustments would impact each of these
important currencies, the authors extend the essentials of their model to
include four regions rather than just two. The analysis focuses on the inter-
relations among the United States, Japan, the euro region, and China, ignor-
ing the rest of the world. The authors assume that half the U.S. current
account deﬁcit is with China and a quarter with each of the others, values
that approximate recent actual deﬁcits. These deﬁcits transfer wealth, and
how that wealth is invested drives exchange rate movements. The model
allows for two special features of the Chinese economy: capital controls
on private financial capital inflows and outflows, and the pegging of the
renminbi to the dollar. Asset preferences in each of the other three regions
are allowed to differ, but all are assumed to have the same marginal
response to changes in expected returns, and interest rates measured in the
domestic currency are assumed to be the same in each. The authors illus-
trate the main forces at work using a simplified version of the model in
which asset demands do not depend on expected returns. For a given U.S.
current account deﬁcit, the more dollar assets China holds, the smaller is the
appreciation of the euro and yen. Surprisingly, if China holds only dollar
assets, a U.S. current account deﬁcit actually causes the dollar to appreciate
against both the euro and the yen, since most of the U.S. deﬁcit is with the
region with extreme dollar preferences. If only Japan accumulates dollars,
both the yen and euro appreciate, with the yen appreciating more. In this
case a transfer of wealth to Japan leaves the real effective exchange rate of
the euro unchanged, as the euro rises against the dollar and falls against
the yen. 
The authors also use this framework to analyze the effects of prospective
changes in China’s policies. If China stops pegging but maintains capital
controls, it will have a zero current account surplus, which would require an
appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar. Reserve accumulation
would then cease, and the U.S. current account deficit would have to be
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accumulation away from the region with extreme dollar preferences would
strengthen the euro and the yen against the dollar. A diversification of
China’s portfolios away from all dollars would have a similar effect. The
same qualitative results are also found in simulations that allow for the
endogenous response of portfolio choices to expected relative returns.
Thus, in the authors’analysis, China’s pegging to the dollar has limited
the appreciation of the euro and yen against the dollar, in contrast to the
opinion of some commentators that it has increased the pressure on the euro
to appreciate. 
The authors briefly address the connections between domestic fiscal and
monetary policy and the U.S. international position. As the U.S. current
account and budget deﬁcits have risen together in the past ﬁve years, they
have frequently been paired in discussions of needed policy changes, with
some commentators identifying the latter as the cause of the former and
calling for reduced ﬁscal deﬁcits as a possible substitute for depreciation.
The authors point out, however, that these are complementary changes
rather than substitutes, with interest rates a key link between the two. With
the dollar depreciating under the pressure of excessive current account
deﬁcits, demand for U.S. output expands, requiring a combination of higher
interest rates and fiscal deficit reduction to maintain domestic balance.
Because higher interest rates would limit the immediate depreciation while
requiring more in the future, smaller budget deﬁcits are the appropriate bal-
ancing change. But, if ﬁscal policy is tightened without dollar depreciation,
the economy is likely to weaken. 
The authors conclude by summarizing the implications of their ﬁndings
for understanding the recent past and projecting the future. In their view the
path of the dollar since the late 1990s has been supported by increases in the
demand for U.S. assets, first by private investors for equities and more
recently by central bank demands for bonds. A shift in preferences away
from U.S. goods has also contributed to growing trade deficits in this
period. Imperfect substitution in portfolios helps account for the gradualism
of exchange rate adjustments and for the persistent U.S. current account
deﬁcits that have been observed. The model predicts that a gradual depre-
ciation of the dollar will be the prevailing trend for an extended period.
However, if the expected demand for U.S. assets falls, as it would if cen-
tral bank policies changed, the decline in the dollar would be more abrupt.
Similarly, the gradual depreciation could be interrupted by a temporary
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the resulting larger trade deﬁcits would lead to an even larger depreciation
eventually. For the same reason, a rise in U.S. interest rates would
strengthen the dollar only temporarily and require a larger depreciation in
the longer run. The authors thus reason that a better policy mix would
combine a reduction of budget deﬁcits with a reduction of interest rates to
maintain growth. 
Turning to China, the authors argue that eventually the government will
find it difficult to continue to sterilize interventions and will abandon its
dollar peg. But the longer the peg will have supported the dollar, the larger
the eventual dollar depreciation will have to be in order for the United
States to service the larger accumulated foreign debt. The authors also
observe that a large dollar depreciation would not necessarily be a major
problem for the United States. By improving the trade balance, it would
permit a reduction of budget deﬁcits without causing a recession. However,
dollar depreciation might pose a bigger problem for Japan and Europe,
which are already growing slowly and which have limited scope for expan-
sionary stabilization policies. 
Some lay commentators have suggested that eliminating the federal
budget deficit would automatically reduce today’s massive deficit in the
U.S. current account. In a 1987 paper, James Tobin identified this as one
of eight “myths” about exchange rates and the current account, because it
ignores the fact that improvements in the current account balance have to
be earned in competition with foreign producers and will, if employment
is to be maintained, require changes in exchange rates and terms of trade. In
the second article in this issue, Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff pur-
sue this theme. They ﬁrst provide a wide-ranging discussion of recent eco-
nomic developments, concluding that the U.S. current account deﬁcit will
before long have to be substantially reduced, if not eliminated. They then
model the price adjustments that would be required to change import and
export patterns in the United States and abroad so as to eliminate or sub-
stantially reduce the U.S current account deﬁcit without reducing aggregate
economic activity. 
Although most analysts recognize that improving the trade balance will
require a real depreciation of the dollar, less attention has been paid to the
likely need for changes in the relative price of traded and nontraded goods
both in the United States and among its trading partners. In earlier work
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likely to be larger than the changes in the relative prices of domestic and
foreign tradable goods—the terms of trade. It is easy to show why this
might be so. Without changes in production anywhere, eliminating the U.S.
current account deficit, which today stands at roughly 6 percent of GDP,
implies something like a 20 percent reduction in U.S. consumption of
traded goods. Assume for simplicity that the traded goods of different coun-
tries are perfect substitutes, so that exchange rate changes do not change the
relative price of different traded goods, but only the prices of nontraded
goods relative to traded goods within countries. Then, with a unitary elas-
ticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and hence con-
stant shares, this 20 percent reduction in consumption of traded goods
requires a fall in the price of nontraded goods relative to traded goods of the
same percentage. In foreign countries, where, under these assumptions,
consumption of traded relative to nontraded goods has to rise, the relative
price of the latter must also rise. If the traded goods of different countries
are not perfect substitutes, the calculations are more complicated, and the
required terms of trade and real exchange rates need to be determined
simultaneously. But the qualitative nature of the needed adjustment is the
same. 
To capture the salient features of the current international environment,
the authors develop their model by assuming three world regions, repre-
senting the United States, Asia, and Europe, all linked by trade and by a
matrix of international asset and liability positions. This enables the authors
to model asymmetries in the trading relationships between regions and to
analyze the implications of dividing the improvement in the U.S. trade
account between Europe and Asia in different ways. The model is short run
and static. Each region produces two goods: a nontraded good consumed
only by its residents, and a traded good that is both consumed domestically
and exported. Hence there are a total of six goods in the world economy. The
regions are endowment economies with flexible prices, implicitly assum-
ing factor immobility between sectors and full employment. 
The preferences of consumers, and in particular the elasticities of sub-
stitution among the different goods, play the central role in determining
price adjustments associated with changes in the current account. Four
commodities are available to consumers in each region—their own region’s
traded and nontraded goods and the traded goods of the other two regions.
The authors model goods preferences in each region by means of two
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an index of overall traded good consumption derived from a bundle of the
three traded goods, and the second aggregates this index with nontraded
good consumption to provide a utility measure for total consumption. 
Although the functional form of these CES functions is the same across
regions, the weights on the commodities differ. In particular, the traded
goods index displays home bias: consumers in each region have a relative
preference for the traded good that it produces and exports. Even though the
law of one price (individual traded goods have the same price everywhere)
holds, the price indexes for each region’s bundle of traded goods will dif-
fer across regions, because each depends on the region’s own consump-
tion weighting of individual traded goods. This implies that an increase in
a region’s income and expenditure improves its terms of trade, raising the
price of its exports relative to that of its imports. The United States and
Europe exhibit mirror symmetry in their preferences for each other’s traded
good but place the same weight on the Asian traded good. Asia meanwhile
weights the U.S. and the European traded goods the same, and the model
allows the weight it places on those goods to be changed, reﬂecting changes
in openness to trade. Whereas the weights on different goods thus differ
across regions, elasticities of substitution among goods are assumed to be
the same for all regions. The authors review a range of empirical studies
to arrive at informed judgments about the size of these elasticities. In their
baseline calculations the elasticity of substitution among tradables is
assumed to be 2, implying that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent change in the
consumption of, say, an Asian import to the United States would be asso-
ciated with a 5 percent change in its price relative to that of the U.S. traded
good. The elasticity of substitution between nontraded goods and the index
of consumption that aggregates the three traded goods is assumed to be 1,
as in the simple example above. 
Given these preferences, the authors can solve for the prices that equate
demand to supply for any global allocation of the six commodities. The
bilateral terms of trade are simply the relative prices of any two regions’
traded goods. Given the assumption of CES utility, the authors compute
exact price indexes for each region’s consumption bundle of traded goods
and for its overall consumption. Ratios of the latter give the corresponding
bilateral real exchange rates.
As noted earlier, even though the law of one price holds, the price
indexes for the bundle of traded goods differ across regions because of
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authors assume that each region’s bundle of traded goods has a 0.25 weight
in total consumption. This means that a change in a region’s bilateral real
exchange rate is 0.25 of the change in the region’s relative price index for
traded goods. That is, changes in the terms of trade, through their differing
effects on regions’price levels for traded goods, can be traced directly to
real exchange rates. For example, if the price of the U.S. traded good falls
relative to the price of Europe’s traded good—an improvement in Europe’s
bilateral terms of trade—the relative price of the United States’traded
goods index will also fall. Hence there will be a real depreciation of the dol-
lar relative to the euro.
Most of the burden of reducing the U.S. current account deficit has to
be borne by U.S. consumers reducing their consumption of traded goods,
but part of the adjustment is accomplished through valuation effects. The
United States is a net debtor, with its liabilities predominantly denominated
in dollars and more than half of the foreign assets held by U.S. residents
denominated in foreign currencies. Depreciation of the dollar therefore
actually decreases U.S. net indebtedness. Although this decrease in U.S. net
worth might be expected to affect demand gradually over time, it has an
immediate effect on the current account. Since foreign-denominated U.S.
assets exceed foreign-denominated U.S. liabilities, and interest payments
are largely denominated in the same currency as the underlying asset, the
dollar value of U.S. net interest receipts rises with a depreciation. 
To estimate the effect on the terms of trade and real exchange rates of
reducing the U.S. current account deﬁcit by 5 percent of GDP, the authors
have to make assumptions about how the offsetting reduction in current
account surpluses is distributed between Europe and Asia. They consider
three scenarios: a global rebalancing scenario, where the current accounts
of all three regions go to zero; a “Bretton Woods II” scenario, where Asia’s
currencies remain pegged to the dollar (a hypothesis analyzed at length in
the paper by Michael Dooley and Peter Garber in this volume); and a muted
version of the latter, where Asia maintains its current account surplus so
that a reduction in Europe’s surplus just balances the U.S. deficit reduction.
Given the assumed baseline elasticities, the changes in consumption
implied by global rebalancing imply very large real exchange rate changes.
The euro appreciates in real terms by over 28 percent, and the Asian cur-
rencies by over 35 percent. The greater real appreciation for Asia reflects
the fact that, initially, Asia has a much larger surplus than Europe, so that
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traded goods. Although these may seem like large numbers, they are not
so different from what would be expected if traded goods were perfect
substitutes as in the earlier example. The fact that they are not, and that
there is home bias, does result in a deterioration of the U.S. terms of trade
with both Europe and Asia of about 14 percent; the result is a slightly larger
real depreciation than would otherwise be required. 
The authors’model is developed entirely in real terms, but they are able
to translate the real exchange rate changes into nominal changes by making
assumptions about how domestic price levels change. If, for example, each
central bank targets stability in its region’s overall consumer price index,
then real exchange rate changes are the only source of nominal exchange
rate change. Stabilizing the GDPdeﬂator, which has different weights than
the consumer price index, gives much the same result. 
The substantial depreciation of the dollar predicted by the model has a
large effect on the Asian net foreign asset position: because 80 percent of
Asia’s foreign asset holdings, but only 34 percent of its foreign liabilities,
are denominated in dollars, Asia’s net foreign asset position is reduced in
value by 60 percent. Although this is a substantial wealth effect, it produces
only a small decline in the current account, in turn only slightly reducing
the required exchange rate adjustment. Europe is in a more balanced posi-
tion and suffers a much smaller loss of wealth, with a negligible effect on
the required dollar depreciation.
The changes in consumption implied by the other two scenarios require
quite different real exchange rate adjustments. Under the authors’Bretton
Woods II scenario, Asia raises its surplus in the process of pegging to the
dollar, increasing the adjustment that Europe must make. Speciﬁcally, Asia
increases its surplus as a percentage of U.S. traded-goods output from its
current 15 percent to 31 percent, and Europe has to move from its current 
5 percent surplus, measured the same way, to a 31 percent deficit. This
adjustment requires an appreciation of the euro by roughly 60 percent
against both the dollar and the Asian currencies. Europe’s terms of trade also
rise dramatically, on the order of 25 percent. The authors conclude that sus-
taining Asia’s peg in the context of a substantial reduction in the U.S. current
account deﬁcit is likely to be politically unacceptable for Europeans. Fur-
thermore, even though Europe’s net foreign asset position is much less sen-
sitive than Asia’s to exchange rate changes, the required appreciation of the
euro would be large enough to result in a signiﬁcant loss in wealth. 
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lar by roughly 20 percent, just enough to keep its current account sur-
plus constant as the United States moves to current account balance, thus
placing less of a burden on Europe than in the Bretton Woods II sce-
nario. Although the euro still has to appreciate by nearly 45 percent
against the dollar, Europe’s effective exchange rate is affected much less,
by 32 percent rather than 60 percent, because of Europe’s substantial
trade with Asia. 
Although the authors believe they have made fairly optimistic assump-
tions about elasticities, which, if anything, understate the required price
adjustments, they also report results under some alternative assumptions.
Raising the elasticity of substitution between nontraded and traded goods
from 1 to 2 reduces the required depreciation of the dollar signiﬁcantly. In
the global rebalancing scenario the real dollar-euro rate rises by 19.3 per-
cent rather than 28.6 percent, and the Asian currencies appreciate by 22.5
percent rather than 35.2 percent—still quite signiﬁcant adjustments. Elim-
inating the changes in the terms of trade by assuming that traded goods
are near-perfect substitutes for each other has similar quantitative effects,
revealing that the terms-of-trade effects were responsible for about a third
of the real dollar depreciation in the baseline model. 
As previously noted, because the United States’foreign debts are mostly
denominated in dollars and its foreign asset holdings mostly in foreign
currencies, valuation effects dampen the depreciation of the dollar required
to eliminate its current account deﬁcit. The authors show that this effect is
modest: in their baseline estimates, the depreciation in terms of the U.S.
effective exchange rate is about 13 percent less than it would be in the
absence of valuation effects, implying that improvements in the trade bal-
ance still have to do the heavy lifting. They also show the effect of the
United States losing its historical ability to borrow at a low interest rate: the
effect of putting the United States on a par with other debtors is of roughly
the same magnitude as the valuation effects estimated above. 
The authors recognize that their model ignores some effects that might
significantly change their estimates of needed dollar depreciation. In par-
ticular, they note that the realism of two of their key assumptions depends
on the time horizon over which adjustments take place. In the short run,
perhaps one or two years, the assumption of factor immobility appears
reasonable, but the assumption of completely ﬂexible prices seems less so.
For the longer run, price flexibility seems more reasonable, but factor
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between sectors will dampen the expected real exchange rate adjustments
compared with the adjustments estimated for the core model. Thus, if cur-
rent account adjustments take place slowly and over many years, a smaller
reduction in the real exchange rate will be required to achieve current
account balance. Although they recognize that their model is incomplete
in this and other ways, the authors believe that the framework they have
developed for understanding needed relative price changes will be essential
in any analysis of major adjustments in current accounts.
The determinants of current account balances have been analyzed
much more extensively than those of international capital flows. But the
interaction of the capital and current accounts in determining exchange
rates highlights that understanding capital flows is just as important as
understanding trade ﬂows. For emerging economies the role of such ﬂows
has received considerable attention and has been identified as an impor-
tant factor in currency crises. However, for the U.S. dollar, which has been
the world’s dominant reserve currency for over half a century, there is less
empirical evidence and considerable uncertainty about how its exchange
rate responds to U.S. current account deﬁcits and the accumulation of dol-
lar assets abroad. In the third article of this issue, Michael Dooley and Peter
Garber expand on what they have elsewhere called the “Revived Bretton
Woods” hypothesis, which stresses the willingness of foreign ofﬁcial sec-
tors to accumulate dollar liabilities, and they marshal support for their pre-
diction that U.S. current account deficits need not trigger a major dollar
devaluation or currency crisis in the foreseeable future. 
Dooley and Garber first describe the key features of the global econ-
omy that underpin their Revived Bretton Woods view. The ﬁrst is China’s
ongoing transformation from a centrally planned to a nascent market econ-
omy, which has moved hundreds of millions of underemployed workers
into the global market for labor. China’s continued economic development
depends on employing such workers, and, in the authors’view, pursuit of
this goal will override the conventional pressures of trade imbalances in
China’s exchange rate strategy. The second is that most successful emerg-
ing economies have been net exporters of capital, contradicting the usual
assumption that successful development involves poor countries borrowing
from rich ones. The authors relate this seeming anomaly to the emerging
economies’need for international capital by arguing that the export of sav-
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ity of their domestic capital formation. In China’s case access to needed
international capital is currently inhibited by the country’s geopolitical past
and its primitive ﬁnancial system. The third key feature is that the large and
growing current account deficit of the United States has been funded at low
interest rates by foreign private and official lenders, suggesting that the
large foreign holdings of U.S. assets have not diminished the demand for
further accumulation. 
The motivation for emerging economies, and particularly China, in
building foreign reserves is central to the authors’argument. Export pro-
motion has long been an accepted strategy for a developing economy, and
the value of building reserves became apparent when foreign capital ﬂight
from East Asia and elsewhere led to the crises of the 1990s. However, these
motives by themselves neither explain recent developments nor predict
how far the reserve buildups will go. Export-led growth alone does not
imply the need for a trade surplus and net export of capital, nor does the
precautionary motive require an indefinite buildup of reserves. However,
the authors hypothesize an additional motive for building reserves, which
today applies most clearly to China. Growth requires efﬁcient capital for-
mation, yet the domestic financial system will, for a long time, not be up
to the task of channeling China’s high rate of saving into a high rate of
productive domestic investment. International financial intermediation
can substitute for the inadequate domestic financial system, but potential
foreign investors are put off by political risk. Dooley and Garber argue
that China’s foreign reserves act as collateral that reduces this risk. They
provide an extensive discussion of the role of private collateral arrange-
ments and the uncertainties that inhibit financial investments in their
absence, citing earlier work by Ricardo Caballero and Arvind Krishna-
murthy on the role of international collateral for private ﬁnancing in devel-
oping economies. The authors observe that the U.S. authorities are legally
empowered to freeze or seize foreign-owned assets under a range of
unusual circumstances, and they identify many occasions when this has
been done. Although the conditions for taking such action are not well
defined or even generally understood, market participants and other gov-
ernments believe that the United States will take similar action in the future
against foreign governments that expropriate private foreign assets. By
holding dollar reserves that are vulnerable to seizure, a country thus pro-
vides effective collateral to potential investors. 
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bled on this role of foreign reserves inadvertently. But they argue that,
having done so, the authorities now accept a continuing buildup of foreign
reserves as support for continued growth in gross inward foreign invest-
ment. Hence the authors’ collateral hypothesis provides a connection
between China’s current account surpluses (or net capital ﬂows) and gross
capital ﬂows. 
In the present geopolitical climate, the collateral hypothesis would seem
more relevant to China than to the more developed Asian economies, espe-
cially Japan. But Dooley and Garber note that Japan has managed its
exchange rate for many years as a way of dealing with its own employ-
ment problem, and they see some of the other Asian economies as moti-
vated to keep their currencies aligned with China’s. They also see little
pressure from market forces that would cause Japan and the other
economies to abandon their reserve buildups. History provides many exam-
ples of market forces overwhelming ofﬁcial attempts at intervention to sup-
port a weak currency, but the analysis of those cases does not necessarily
apply to interventions to repress a strong currency. Nor have the constraints
that often arise when undervaluation or intervention leads to excessive
monetary expansion and overheating been a problem for China or for other
developing Asian economies, and those constraints are clearly irrelevant for
today’s cyclically depressed Japan. 
Having thus explained why, in their view, these buildups of dollar
reserves abroad may continue, the authors turn to historical evidence of past
episodes of buildups and how they have ended. From a sample of 115
developing and industrial countries for the period 1970–2004, they identify
episodes in which a country ran current account surpluses for several con-
secutive years and the government increased its net foreign asset position
by at least 25 percent of the change in national net foreign assets. They
find several regularities in these episodes, one of which is that the typical
episode of reserve buildup has a relatively benign ending. With few excep-
tions, current account surpluses grew during the period of reserve accu-
mulation. When the accumulation stopped, current account surpluses
declined on average by 2 percent of GDP in the first year, suggesting that
the accumulation typically ended as a result of some shock to the previous
situation. On average, a real appreciation occurred in the last three years
of reserve accumulation, which in itself suggests a fundamental disequi-
librium in the exchange rate and the current account. But rather than sub-
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currencies on average depreciated and economic growth moderated.
From this analysis of the typical experience, the authors turn to a more
detailed look at Japan, China, and Korea, which together accounted for 
45 percent of global reserve holdings at the end of 2004. Since 1970 Japan
has had three episodes of extended reserve accumulation: the ﬁrst starting
in 1986 and lasting three years, the second starting in 1992 and lasting
ﬁve years, and the current episode, which started in 1999. Based on the pat-
tern of the ﬁrst two episodes, the authors project a moderate real apprecia-
tion of the yen and moderate economic growth in Japan in the immediate
future, with reserve accumulation ending when the current account deteri-
orates, at which time the real value of the yen will fall. Korea experienced
net reserve accumulation from 1986 to 1989 and again from 1998 to the
present. The end of the ﬁrst episode coincided with a decline in the current
account surplus and a slowdown in GDP growth. The authors ﬁnd nothing
unusual about the present episode, with reserve accumulation roughly
matching the current account surpluses and the won strengthening moder-
ately in real terms.
China’s episode of reserve accumulation is the longest in the entire sam-
ple, extending from 1990 to the present. Small current account surpluses
were roughly matched by reserve accumulation from 1990 to 2001. Since
then, however, China’s experience has been without modern precedent:
the current account surplus has grown rapidly, and private capital inﬂows
have been roughly as large; hence reserve accumulation has been about
twice as large as the surplus. Because the authorities have been able to
control inﬂation, the authors see no pressure to end the accumulation. How-
ever, they suggest that the buildup might end if an interruption of direct
investment inﬂows or liberalization of capital outﬂows were to lead to a real
depreciation of the renminbi. 
From these examinations of past episodes, the authors draw several gen-
eralizations. They ﬁnd almost no support for the idea that reserve accumu-
lations end with speculative attacks that force the currency to appreciate.
Rather, they typically end when the current account surplus declines sub-
stantially or swings into deﬁcit, and they are followed by a real depreciation
and a modest downturn in the economy. One implication is that episodes
of reserve buildups do not end with capital losses on the government’s
reserves. Nor do they end with recessions generated by a sharp real appre-
ciation. From this evidence the authors judge that there are no constraints or
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rent account surplus economies from continuing to finance U.S. current
account deﬁcits, as the Revived Bretton Woods hypothesis predicts. Dooley
and Garber expect that China’s present ﬁnancial repression of capital ﬂows
and distortion of the real exchange rate will end when the country’s indus-
trial sector has grown sufficiently and the domestic financial system has
become capable of efficient intermediation. But they also expect that this
will take a long time. 
Many analysts and commentators in the business and ﬁnancial press
see the U.S. international net debtor position as a major risk on the eco-
nomic horizon, not only for the United States but possibly also for the
global economy. In the fourth article in this volume, Sebastian Edwards
examines the recent history of the U.S. current and capital accounts, mod-
els some likely paths for them in the years ahead, and examines historical
episodes of sustained deficits and growing foreign indebtedness in other
countries for clues to how serious a risk the present U.S. situation entails. 
Edwards starts with a brief history of the U.S. international position in
the three decades since exchange rates began floating in the early 1970s.
Focusing on the real trade-weighted exchange rate of the dollar and the
ratio of the U.S. current account balance to GDP, he identiﬁes two extended
episodes of major imbalance. The ﬁrst began in the early 1980s, when the
current account went deeply into deficit following a sharp real appreciation
of the dollar. This episode resolved when a steep depreciation that began
in 1985 returned the current account brieﬂy to balance by 1991. The second
is the present enlargement of the deficit to record levels, which started
with a period of appreciation of the dollar from the mid-1990s to 2002 and
has continued despite the real depreciation that followed. 
Each year’s current account deficit worsens the U.S. net international
investment position (NIIP) by a corresponding amount. But the NIIP, which
is measured in dollars, is also affected by changes in the valuation of assets
held across borders. These valuation effects occur as exchange rate move-
ments change the dollar value of foreign assets held by U.S. nationals. In
the 1980s valuation effects that were predominantly positive partly offset
the adverse effects of large current account deﬁcits on the U.S. NIIP. Nev-
ertheless, by 1986 the United States had become a net debtor, and the mas-
sive deﬁcits of the current episode have increased the net debt position to
about 30 percent of GDP. However, because the returns on U.S. assets held
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assets held by U.S. nationals, the income component of the current account
has to date remained positive. The entire current account deﬁcit thus con-
sists of an enormous deﬁcit in goods and services trade and a modest deﬁcit
in transfers to foreigners. 
Edwards turns next to an analysis of where the U.S. current account, real
exchange rate, and NIIPare likely to go from here. The three are, of course,
interrelated, with the main linkages coming from the exchange rate affect-
ing the trade balance, portfolio investments affecting the demand for dol-
lars, and the balance between portfolio and trade flows affecting the
exchange rate. Edwards captures these interrelationships in a model whose
main features include elements of the models of Blanchard, Giavazzi, and
Sa and of Obstfeld and Rogoff in their papers in this volume. Asset
demands are driven by wealth, with a bias for home assets and exogenously
determined portfolio shares. (The inclusion of demand by foreign central
banks can be treated as a shift in this home bias.) Trade flows are driven
by the real exchange rate, which affects the relative prices of traded and
nontraded goods and services, and by ﬂuctuations and growth in incomes;
the magnitude of these effects is determined by price and income elastici-
ties in the United States and abroad. With this model Edwards is able to
analyze long-run equilibriums, that is, the eventual adjustments to real
exchange rates and current accounts that can be expected in response to
various shocks. With some simplifying assumptions, the sustainable ratio of
the U.S. current account to GDP is proportional to the growth rate of U.S.
nominal GDP, with the proportionality depending on the relative returns
and riskiness of its assets and the degree of integration of capital markets—
factors captured in the portfolio balance parameters. 
To go further and characterize the dynamic path of such adjustments to
equilibrium, Edwards includes partial adjustments for asset holdings, which
allow for imperfections in countries’capital markets, and for the current
account, which allow for consumption smoothing. As an example of the
resulting rich dynamics, he shows that a decline in home bias in the rest of
the world, which would increase the sustainable U.S. current account
deﬁcit, would lead initially to the deﬁcit overshooting its new equilibrium
level. 
Edwards applies his model to the current situation by calibrating its para-
meters using values from earlier studies and values for the dynamic adjust-
ment terms that best explain the behavior of the U.S. current account since
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portfolio choices, focusing on a speciﬁcation in which the desired propor-
tions of foreign and domestic assets remain ﬁxed after the shock. The sim-
ulations also assume that annual economic growth rates in the United States
and abroad average 3 percent and that the terms of trade do not change. In
his base case, foreigners are assumed to gradually increase the desired
proportion of dollar asset holdings in their portfolios from the present 
30 percent to 40 percent in 2010, while U.S. nationals reduce their desired
holdings of U.S. assets from 73 percent to 71 percent over the same period.
These portfolio shifts have the effect of doubling foreigners’net demand for
U.S. assets to an amount equal to 60 percent of U.S. GDP by the end of
the period. With this increase in demand for U.S. assets, the dollar appre-
ciates in real terms for the first four years and then depreciates rapidly,
eventually approaching a new equilibrium 19 percent below its initial 2005
level. The current account deficit initially continues to grow, peaking at
7.3 percent of GDP after four years. It declines sharply thereafter,
approaching an equilibrium ratio of 3.2 percent of GDP after a few more
years. The reversal of the trade deﬁcit is even sharper and larger because the
growing net debt position raises net income payments to foreigners. The
main qualitative findings from this base case are robust under a range of
alternative assumptions about the model’s parameters. 
Edwards simulates alternative assumptions about portfolio choice to test
what difference they make to the outcome. If, after the initial ﬁve years, for-
eign investors gradually reduce their holdings of U.S. assets to 50 percent
rather than 60 percent of U.S. GDP, the real depreciation and current
account reversals are steeper and eventually greater. After three years the
depreciation is 24 percent and the current account deficit has shrunk by
5.3 percent of GDP. Both changes continue for two more years, overshoot-
ing their eventual equilibrium values: an exchange rate about 23 percent
below, and a current account deﬁcit about 3.5 percent of GDPsmaller than,
2004 values. Although the size of these changes is within U.S. historical
experience, once the changes get under way, their abruptness, which comes
from dollar accumulations abroad reaching an assumed limit, could be
destabilizing. Edwards notes that different parameters for the adjustment
process could produce less abrupt changes, but he regards the qualitative
characteristics of the simulations as representative of the model’s dynam-
ics. And he notes that all the reported simulations assume foreign demand
for U.S. assets far exceeding today’s 30 percent of GDP.
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accompanied by disruptions to employment and growth in the affected
economies. Edwards looks to international experience with such reversals
to see whether it offers any insight into what is in store if the United States
undergoes the kind of changes predicted by his simulations. He deﬁnes two
types of current account reversal, one in which the current account deﬁcit
declines by at least 6 percent of GDP within a three-year period, and one
in which it declines by at least 4 percent in a single year. For the period
1971-2001 he finds that the first type of reversal occurs in 9.2 percent of
all country-years, and the second type in 11.8 percent of all country-years.
He reports a number of other interesting ﬁndings, including a close associ-
ation of reversals and currency crises, a particular exchange rate pattern that
typifies reversals, and a correlation of reversals with economic growth.
However, the great majority of the reversals he finds are for small or less
developed countries. The corresponding incidences of the two types of cur-
rent account reversal for industrial countries are only 2.7 percent and 2.0
percent, and most of those reversals occurred in small countries. Among the
larger industrial countries, only Italy (in 1975) and Canada (in 1982) expe-
rienced reversals in this thirty-year period. Thus, although Edwards’s rich
analysis of historical reversals illuminates the structural and economic con-
ditions—and the problems—typically associated with them, the relevance
to the current U.S. situation is unclear. 
Edwards believes nonetheless that it is very likely that the United States
will undergo a major adjustment in the not-too-distant future, which will
modify the present global imbalances between the U.S. and rest-of-world
current accounts. He identiﬁes three main unresolved issues that will shape
how that adjustment unfolds. One is how central banks conduct their
reserves policy in a global economy with mostly flexible exchange rates.
He notes that, in contrast to the argument made by Dooley and Garber in
this volume, many observers believe that foreign central banks that have
been accumulating dollar reserves will reduce their demand for dollar
assets in the future, unleashing an abrupt collapse in the value of the dol-
lar. Another issue is how world interest rates, which inﬂuence global invest-
ment, will be affected by a major adjustment to the U.S. current account.
And the third is how private sector saving and government budget balances
evolve, and whether, in tandem with interest rate adjustments, they will suc-
ceed in maintaining global economic growth as the correction of today’s
current account imbalances works itself out. 
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the labor force in future decades. The baby-boom generation is approach-
ing retirement, no new explosion of fertility is in sight, and the growth in
female labor force participation that began in the 1960s is seen as largely
complete. Some forecasters also predict a slowing of productivity growth
in the longer run, although this is more controversial: the Social Security
Administration’s 2005 trustees’report projects that hours worked will grow
by only 0.3 percent a year from 2015 to 2045, a slowdown of 1.2 percent-
age points from the average for this measure from 1958 to 2004. The trustees
also predict that long-run productivity growth will moderate from its pace of
the last ﬁfteen years and that together these two factors will lead to a slow-
down of GDPgrowth of between 1.6 and 2.2 percentage points a year. Along
with increases in longevity, these projections are the major reason that the
Social Security system in its present form will be unable to maintain cur-
rent beneﬁts into the indeﬁnite future. Given this outlook, if equity invest-
ments earn as high a return as they have over the postwar period on average,
then investing a portion of the Social Security trust fund in equities, or cre-
ating private accounts to allow individual workers to do so, seems an attractive
and almost costless way to improve the system’s prospects. However, in
the ﬁfth article in this issue, Dean Baker, Bradford DeLong, and Paul Krug-
man question this reasoning, arguing that rates of return on equities are
unlikely to match their historical levels if the pessimistic projections of labor
force and productivity growth in the trustees’report are correct.
Standard economic growth models provide a relevant framework for
analyzing the long-run effects of labor force and productivity growth on
national income growth and the rate of return to capital. The authors begin
by reviewing the predictions of the mainstay of growth analysis, the Solow
model. In steady state the growth rate of national income is the sum of the
growth rates of hours worked and labor-augmenting technical progress, and
the capital stock grows at the same rate as income. At any income growth
rate the net saving rate determines the capital-to-output ratio, which in
turn determines wage rates and the rate of return to capital. It is easy to
show that a change in the rate of growth of labor input or labor productiv-
ity results in a proportional change in the rate of return to capital, with the
proportionality being the ratio of capital’s share of income (which is
assumed constant) to the gross saving rate. 
The Solow model takes the saving rate as given, so that the output-to-
capital ratio and the rate of return to capital fall with a reduction in growth.
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stant. This leads the authors to analyze two canonical models that address
the effect of changing demographics on saving and hence on the rate of
return. The ﬁrst is the Ramsey model, a highly stylized model that assumes
that the representative household lives forever, maximizing utility over a
consumption path into the indefinite future. Population growth in this
model is captured by assuming that the size of the representative household
grows over time. Household saving decisions maximize the welfare of this
dynastic household, given the projected growth in household size. Usually
it is assumed that the household’s utility in a given period is simply the sum
of the utilities of the members present in that period, and that the household
decisionmaker, contemplating the future, gives the same weight to the util-
ity of the new members as to his or her own. (The authors call this “per-
fect familial altruism.”) With these assumptions and the assumption that
utility is proportional to the logarithm of consumption (log utility), the
steady-state rate of return rises one for one with labor productivity growth,
as does the growth rate of consumption per worker. However, the rate of
return is unaffected by population growth. The reason for this can most eas-
ily be seen by abstracting from productivity growth, so that consumption
per capita is constant through time. Without population growth, the infi-
nitely lived individual will want to accumulate capital to the point where
the rate of return equals the rate of time preference. With population
growth, the same condition will hold. The fact that a forgone unit of con-
sumption by each household member today has to be divided among 1 + n
members tomorrow is just balanced by the fact that there will be 1 + n
fully weighted members tomorrow. So, as with a single individual, the
rate of return will be driven to the rate of time preference. 
Why are these results different from those of the Solow model? In both
models, in the steady state, each new member of the labor force has to be
equipped with capital. In the Solow model the saving rate is constant, so
that the capital-to-labor ratio is higher when there are fewer workers to
equip with capital. In the Ramsey model the saving rate falls to keep the
capital-to-labor ratio and the rate of return to capital unchanged. Baker,
DeLong, and Krugman ﬁnd the assumption of perfect familial altruism in
the Ramsey model implausible, particularly when many of the future mem-
bers of society are expected to be immigrants unrelated to today’s members.
They show that if there is less than perfect altruism, so that current gener-
ations give less weight to future generations than to themselves, then, when
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vious rate of return on capital. 
There are several reasons why the Ramsey model is ill suited for ana-
lyzing the effects of demographic change on saving and the rate of return.
There is no meaningful way to analyze saving for retirement in a model
where individuals live and work forever. Nor can the model analyze the
effects on saving of changes in birth and death rates, the age of retirement,
or uncertainty about the length of life. However, the second canonical
model the authors examine, the Diamond overlapping-generations model,
can readily incorporate such features. In this model, versions of which have
been used by other authors to estimate empirically the effects of demo-
graphic change in the United States and elsewhere, individuals are assumed
to go through a life cycle of earning, saving, and consuming. Each agent
lives two periods, working and saving when young and consuming the
returns on capital acquired through that saving when old. Generations all
have the same preferences but differ in consumption opportunities as pro-
ductivity grows over time. Individuals are assumed to maximize the pre-
sent value of the utility of consumption over their two-period lifetimes,
using log utility and with no bequest motive. Output is given by a Cobb-
Douglas function combining the labor input of the young and the capital
owned by the old. 
Even though it abstracts from some realistic features of the typical life
cycle, the Diamond model shows the fundamental differences that arise
from assuming finite rather than infinite horizons. First, the rate of return
bears no necessary relationship to the pure rate of time preference. House-
holds optimally allocate their income over two periods, and so determine
individual household saving, but aggregate saving depends crucially on
the demographic structure. 
With log utility, the fraction of income saved is independent of the rate
of return—income and substitution effects just balance—making the analy-
sis quite simple. In the absence of population or productivity growth, aggre-
gate (net) saving would be zero: in every period the dissaving of retirees
just balances the saving of the equally numerous young. With population
growth there are more savers relative to dissavers, so that the capital stock
grows along with the labor force in steady state. However, since the sav-
ing of one generation of workers is used by the more numerous next gen-
eration, the capital-to-labor ratio is lower and the rate of return higher than
with a constant population. If saving per worker were ﬁxed, the capital-to-
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of workers. The resulting increase in the steady-state real rate of return
would have no effect on saving with log utility, but the lower wage would
reduce the saving of workers, resulting in an even greater increase in the
rate of return than would otherwise be the case. And, if the utility function
were less elastic than under log utility, as most analysts believe, the increase
in the return to capital would in turn reduce saving, raising the rate of return
even further. Productivity growth—an increase in the labor equivalence of
a worker—divides one generation’s saving among a greater number of
equivalent workers and has the same effect as labor force growth on the rate
of return and wages. 
The authors conclude that there are good reasons to believe that the rate
of return on capital will fall if population growth and productivity growth
slow. Since capital is the underlying asset generating returns for the owners
of ﬁrms, it is hard to construct a scenario where a permanent decline in the
rate of return on capital does not imply a similar decline in equity returns.
The authors illustrate this by examining the implications of the standard
Gordon equation for equity prices. The rate of return on an equity claim is
its current yield plus capital gains. In the absence of news that affects a
company’s prospects, the price of its stock grows with its dividends. The
Gordon equation simply shows that the price of a stock is equal to its cur-
rent dividend divided by the expected rate of return minus the growth rate
of dividends. Applying this equation to projections for the aggregate econ-
omy, the authors calculate that, if real GDPgrows at the 1.5 percent annual
rate consistent with the 2005 trustees’report, and assuming a constant cap-
ital share, real earnings on capital will likewise grow at 1.5 percent a year,
as will dividends in the absence of changes in ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio or the
dividend payout rate. With this growth rate and the current dividend yield,
the Gordon equation implies an expected annual real rate of return on
stocks of 4.4 percent, considerably less than the 6.5 percent annual real
return averaged over the past half-century. Thus the authors conclude that
this measure of market expectations is consistent with the fall in the rate
of return on capital that they infer from their analysis of growth models. 
How might future stock market returns be higher than this calculation
suggests? The authors discuss several possibilities but in the end are skep-
tical of their importance. The capital in the growth models corresponds to
all productive assets in the economy, including, for example, those of unin-
corporated enterprises. Thus the rate of return to capital in traded firms
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authors see no reason to expect that this is so. A firm’s earnings and divi-
dends typically go through a life cycle, so that the growth in dividends for
the economy as a whole, reflecting the emergence of new firms, may dif-
fer from that of existing ﬁrms. But the authors suggest that this difference
may mean lower rather than higher dividend growth for a broad stock
index. Nor do the authors see much room to increase dividend payout rates.
With a decline in the rate of return to capital, increased payouts to stock-
holders have to come either at the expense of bondholders or from a reduc-
tion in retained earnings. Although reducing leverage could temporarily
raise the fraction of earnings paid to stockholders, such reductions could
not continue indeﬁnitely. 
As the authors show using the Solow model, a reduction in the saving
rate could maintain a higher rate of return to capital by avoiding the
increase in the capital-to-labor ratio. In that case, although growth in output
would still fall as a result of the fall in growth rates of population and pro-
ductivity, with growth in earnings and dividends following suit, the divi-
dend yield would be higher, with less retained earnings and household
saving required to grow capital at the lower rate. Because there would be
less capital along the economy’s growth path, the rate of return would be
maintained despite the lower growth rate. 
The most interesting possibility for maintaining a higher rate of return
is a shift in the distribution of world investment away from the United
States to regions where the labor force is growing faster and potential
returns are higher. The authors reason that, if American companies were to
increase their investment abroad, the growth of earnings of companies in
the index could exceed the rate of growth of the domestic economy. How-
ever, they calculate that achieving the historical 6.5 percent return by this
approach would require that companies increase their foreign investment
by historically unprecedented proportions, unless that investment substi-
tuted for U.S. domestic investment. 
The authors also point out that, unless the U.S. trade balance changes,
any such increase in U.S. ﬁrms’investment abroad will have to be balanced
by increased capital inflows of the same magnitude, reducing returns on
domestic capital. Hence, if there is no change in U.S. saving, there will be
no net effect on the growth of the domestic capital stock, and thus no effect
on the rate of return in the United States. They do not address the possibil-
ity that any improvement in the trade balance, coming perhaps from dollar
William C. Brainard and George L. Perry xxxvdepreciation, would reduce domestic investment for a given level of saving.
Restoring balance in U.S. trade would reduce net capital inflows, domes-
tic investment, and growth in the domestic capital stock by the same
amount. Since the current account deﬁcit today is near 6 percent of GDP, a
major fraction of the capital deepening associated with slowed population
and productivity growth could be avoided in this way. 
Historically, equities have paid a signiﬁcantly higher return than bonds,
resulting in a large (and, many argue, excessive) risk premium on equities.
If this equity premium can be counted on to persist, it would seem to pro-
vide a good reason for private investors, or the Social Security trust fund, to
invest more heavily in equities and less heavily in bonds. But the authors
observe that the reason for the high premium remains a puzzle, a fact that
argues for caution in adopting any strategy to capitalize on the premium in
the future. Insofar as the premium reﬂects a failure of markets to efﬁciently
allocate risk among individuals, it could make sense for the government,
the agent with the greatest ability to manage systematic risk, to take a direct
position in equities. But if, as some believe, the growing sophistication of
markets is already in the process of eliminating the equity premium, the
gains from switching to equities from bonds will disappear. In that case any
attempt to exploit the premium would fail in the long run. 
The authors acknowledge that much uncertainty remains about what
the future holds for economic growth. But, they argue, the main inference
of their analysis is that it is precisely in those cases when growth slows
that returns to equities are likely to be lower than historical experience.
Thus, if slower growth does contribute to the Social Security problem,
investment in equities is likely to disappoint as a solution.
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